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INTRODUCTION 
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Untll the eighties Japan was malnly concerned with high economie 
growth promoted by considerable exports to the United States and 
Western Europe. The Japanese companies and financial instltutlons 
could finance the required investments from the voluminous household 
savings and could also accumulate substantial reserves. These reserves 
enabled Japanese companies to extend strongly their direct foreign 
investments during the eighties. Furthermore, after the rise of 
Japanese industry, the second half of the eighties were characterized 
by the advance of Japanese banking and securities business. The 
financial instltutlons were prlmarily focused on domestic develop-
ments, but during the recent years they became more consclous of their 
dominance in the global financial system. Heasured by the size of 
assets, no less than nine of the ten biggest banks in the world are 
Japanese-1-). Furthermore, the big four Japanese securities companies 
all belong to the world top 10. Moreover, the monetary policy by the 
Bank of Japan increasingly affects the international monetary system. 
On the one side the domestic credit expansion in Japan influences the 
global money supply, on the other side Japanese exchange and money 
market management plays a prominent part in the process of internatio-
nal monetary coordination within the Group of Seven (67). 
In this article we will discuss the evolution of the financial system 
in Japan and lts consequences for the monetary policy implemented by 
the Bank of Japan. Firstly, the Japanese financial instltutlons and 
markets are set out with emphasls on deposltory instltutlons and on 
interbank and open money markets because of their relevance for 
monetary policy. 
Secondly, we describe the progress of financial Innovation and libera-
lization in Japan which took off in the late seventies and early 
eighties. 
Thirdly, the objectives, indicators and Instruments of monetary policy 
by the Bank are analysed with special reference to the transmlsslon 
mechanism of monetary policy. A distinction is made between the 
traditional, new and modern monetary policy. 
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FINANCIAL INSTITÜTIONS 
The Japanese financial instltutlons can be dlvided Into flnanclal 
Intermedlarles and other Instltutlons and the intermedlarles can be 
subdlvlded Into depository and non-depository Instltutlons. A classi-
fication of financial Instltutlons according to their business featu-
res and customers Is glven In Flgure 1. 
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The city banks are the largest of all commercial banks and hold 20% of 
the total deposlts of all financial Instltutlons. These banks are 
based In large cltles. They possess extenslve branch networks wlthln 
Japan and have also International business networks. The city banks 
provlde the greater part of short-term flnance to domestlc companles 
and belong all to the world's 25 largest banks2). 
The reglonal banks have thelr headquarters throughout the country not 
only In large cltles, but also In smaller cltles. These banks mostly 
operate In local areas, l.e. thelr prefectures. They conduct the same 
business as city banks, although on a smaller scale. The reglonal 
banks lend to Indlvlduals and small-to medlum-sized business. Thelr 
main source of fundlng are Indlvldual deposlts. 
The long-term credit banks (LTCBs) are the most Important group wlthln 
the long-term financial Instltutlons. The three LTCBs were organlzed 
under the Long-Term Credit Bank Law to provlde long-term flnance to 
domestlc manufacturers. They carry out their fundlng mainly by deben-
tures, but are also allowed to accept deposlts from the Japanese 
government, local governments and private companles. 
The seven trust banks are another group of long-term financial instl-
tutlons. These banks are -unlike the LTCBs- permitted to conduct both 
ordinary banking and trust businesses under separate accounts. Their 
trust actlvitles consist of the management of loans and funds and 
include e.g. money trusts, securities investment trusts and pension 
funds. 
FIGURE 1 A Glassification of Japanese financial institutions 
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The flnanclal Instltutlons for small businesses comprlse three groups: 
the sogo banks, the shlnkln banks and the credit cooperatlves. The 
sogo banks used to be mutual non-profit organlzatlons, but vere 
converted In 1951 lnto profIt-orlented corporatlons. The shlnkln banks 
are mutual assoclatlons of small businesses and provlde ordlnary 
banking services and installment businesses to thelr members. The 
credit cooperatlves are cooperatlve flnanclal Instltutlons on a mutual 
base for small businesses and accept deposlts and Installment savlngs 
from thelr members to lend or discount bllls to them. 
The Zenshlnren Bank and the National Federatlon of Credit Cooperatlves 
act as the central bank for respectlvely the shlnkln banks and credit 
cooperatlves. 
The flnanclal Instltutlons for agrlculture, forestry and flshery are 
organlzed on natlonal, prefectorial and munlclpal level. They provlde 
flnanclal services to farmers, foresters and fishermen on a mutual 
base. The Norlnchukln Bank acts as the central bank for these Instltu-
tlons. Thls bank Is the seventh largest of the world and holds the 
blggest private portfolio of Japanese governments bonds. 
The maln non-deposltory Instltutlons are the Insurance companles, 
whlch are legally dlvlded In two groups: the llfe Insurance companles 
and non-llfe Insurance companles (flre and marine Insurance compa-
nles). The Insurance companles use thelr premiums to lend to industri-
al corporatlons and, recently, to lnvest In securltles. They hold the 
largest portfolio of Japanese stocks. The securltles companles belong 
to the other flnanclal Instltutlons. They dominate the prlmary and 
secondary markets for domestlc stocks and bonds, but also play a role 
In the open money markets. The "big four" securltles companles are 
Nomura, Dalwa, Nlkko and Yamalchl and conduct about 70% of the total 
underwritlng and half of all trades on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
The most Important public flnanclal lnstltutlon Is the Postal Savlngs 
System wlth a network of approximately 24.000 local post offices and 
30% of all deposlts by Japanese households. Thls lnstltutlon Is under 
the supervlslon of the Mlnlstry of Fosts and Telecommunlcatlons. 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The Japanese flnanclal markets are to be dlvlded lnto the money 
markets for (very) short-term flnance and the capltal markets for 
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medium -and long- term flnance. The money markets wlth assets of less 
than one year maturity can be subdlvlded in the interbank and open 
money markets. The capltal markets wlth assets of more than one year 
maturity may be spilt up into the prlmary and secondary markets for 
stocks and bonds and other markets based on these markets, such as the 
bond futures market . Hence, we shall concentrate on the money 
markets because of thelr Importance for monetary policy making in 
Japan. The heart of the money market are the interbank markets where 
only flnanclal instltutlons borrov and lend short-term funds. The maln 
borrowers in the interbank markets are the city banks and large 
regional banks, e.g. the Bank of Yokohama, and the most Important 
lenders are the Zenshinren Bank and the Norinchukin Bank. 
The interbank markets comprise three parts: the call (money) market, 
the (commercial) bllls market and the dollar call (money) market. 
Since 1927 the call market requires as collateral government bonds or 
bllls emitted by corporations. Hovever, in 1985 an uncollateralized 
call market was created vhlch became attractive for foreign banks for 
the lack of collateral. 
Both on the collateralized and uncollateralized call market funds were 
traded wlth a very short maturity, from overnight till three weeks. 
The bills market began in 1971 as a market for discounting commercial 
bllls wlth a maturity from 1 to 6 months. The Bank of Japan is the 
maln buyer in the bills market and uses thls market for lts money 
market operations. 
The dollar call market was created in 1972 to borrow and lend foreign 
currency funds -mostly US dollars- wlth a (very) short maturity in 
Tokyo. Only domestic and foreign banks have access to this market. 
Besides the interbank money markets, there are also the open money 
markets in vhlch both flnanclal and non-financial instltutlons can 
participate. The open markets include eight different submarkets: the 
gensaki market, the certificate of deposit (CD) market, the Euro-yen 
market, the banker's acceptance (BA) market, the flnanclal bills (FB) 
market, the treasury bills (TB) market, the Japan Off-shore market 
(JOH) and the commercial paper (CP) market. The gensaki market was 
established in 1949 as a market to sell/buy temporarily securities. 
These securities will be repurchased/resold at a predetermined time 
and price wlthin 6 months af ter the sale/purchase. In 1979 CDs were 
introduced by depository instltutlons, especially city banks. Because 
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the CD rates are unregulated and negotiable, the CD market became an 
Important open market In successlve years. On the Euro-yen market off-
shore transactlons can be conducted without collateral and withhol-
dlng tax. This market may be consldered as one of the most llberallzed 
open markets and thus functions as an substltute for domestlc open 
markets. 
The BA market was created In 1985 for trading BAs, i.e. a fixed-term 
blll of exchange Issued by an exporter or lmporter to settle a trade 
transactlon and then underwrltten by a bank. Because of the progressl-
ve stamp tax on the Issue of BAs, the volume of thls market has 
shrlnked slnce lts establishment. 
On the FB market temporary shortages of govemment funds are covered 
by discount bllls wlth a maturlty of mostly 60 days. The FB rates are 
below the level of the discount rate and market rates and therefore 
all Issued FBs are subscrlbed by the Bank of Japan. The volume of thls 
market is relatively llmlted untll now. 
The TB market Is also Intended to flnance temporary govemment shorta-
ges, but the discount bllls have a maturlty of 60 or 90 days and are 
only Issued for refundlng. Thls market reached a volume of Yen 5.5 
trillion by end-March 1990. 
The JOH, whlch was establlshed In december 1986, Is a relatively non-
regulated market for transactlons between non-residents. The JOM is 
separated from the domestlc flnancial markets and has become one of 
the leading offshore centers of the world. 
In November 1987 the CF market was establlshed and lts volume has 
grown considerably slnce then. CPs are short-term assets issued by 
non-financial institutions to replace bank loans. They allow more 
flexible funding to corporations at lower costs. The CP market is 
of ten called a quasi-interbank market, because CPs are mainly traded 
among banks. 
FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND LIBERALIZATION 
Tlll the end of the sixties the pace of flnancial innovation was slow 
in Japan. From 1973 this changed by the transition to floating exchan-
ge rates and the rise of inflation rates throughout the world. Fur-
thermore, the flrst oll crisis resulted in large issues of Japanese 
govemment bonds to flnance public debt. In addltlon, there was a 
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development towards open money and capital markets, in particular 
Euro-currency markets. Finally, the rapid progress of computer and 
Information technology resulted in lover costs of financial inno-
vations and higher profit opportunities for financial institutions. 
The most important financial innovations were the introduction of CDs 
in May 1979 and money market certificates (MMCs) in March 1985 by 
banks and the creation of so-called chukoku funds -i.e. portfolios 
containing medium-term government bonds- in January 1980 by securities 
companies^'. The processes of financial innovations and financial 
liberalization had theit impact on the Japanese financial system. At 
first this meant a gradual relazation and abolishment of interest rate 
regulations - i.c. interest rate ceilings - for large bank deposits. 
As a result, interest rates for deposits of three months to two years 
maturity vith a minimum amount of one billion yen were fully liberali-
zed in October 1985. Furthermore, this minimum for large time deposits 
was gradually reduced to 20 million yen. However, a complete liberali-
zation of interest rates for small time deposits is hampered by the 
existence of a non-profit-oriented Postal Savings System which can not 
be enforced to determine its interest rates by market rates. Another 
aspect of liberalization was the reduction of the minimum amount for 
CDs to 100 million yen and for MMCs to 10 million yen and the abolish-
ment of the maximum volume for issues of CDs and MMCs. The process of 
liberalization resulted, as might be expected, in a rise of the open 
money market volume and a decline of the interbank money market volume 
from 1984. As a consequence, the Bank of Japan influenced the money 
market interest rate not only by transactions in the interbank market 
(mainly call and bills market), but also conducted operations in the 
open market (in particular gensaki and CD market). This development 
continued until the Autumn of 1988 when the volume of the interbank 
market, especially the bills market, shrinked as a result of increa-
sing open market rates, compared with relatively stable interest rates 
in the interbank market. The decreasing volume of the interbank market 
reduced the influence of the Bank of Japan on the money market rate 
and compelled the Bank to deregulate the interbank market as from 
November 1988. 
Firstly, the Bank liberalized the interest rate of (commercial) bills 
which was regulated till then. 
Secondly, the range of maturities for the call and bills market was 
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adjusted In order to realize more fine tunlng In the money market-''. 
Thirdly, the quantitative restrlctlons for the uncollateralized call 
market were abollshed and the permltted maturity for thls market was 
extended to relnforce the arbitrage between lnterbank and open mar-
kets. These swlft and radlcal measures by the Bank of Japan resulted 
In more than a doubllng of the lnterbank market volume during the 
perlod November 1988-July 1989. 
Moreover, the arbitrage between lnterbank and open markets strenghened 
In that perlod as appears from the narrowlng dlfference of lnterbank 
and open market rates. See for thls dlfference Flgure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 
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Hence, we wlll discuss the segmentatlon wlthln the Japanese flnanclal 
system. An Important characterlstlc of thls system Is the still 
exlstlng separatlon of banking and securities business. In the pre-
war perlod, there was no legal provislon whlch separated banking and 
securities business In Japan. After the war the legal base for the 
separatlon of deposltory and non-deposltory Instltutlons was founded 
clearly In the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948, In partlcular by 
Artlcle 65 of that law. The Japanese law was based on the Glass-
Steagall Act whlch separated banking and securities business slmllarly 
In the United States. Artlcle 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law 
prohlblts banks from engaglng in the securities business, unless there 
Is an investment motlve or a trust contract. Furthermore, thls law 
provldes wlth a separatlon wlthln the deposltory Instltutlons, between 
commercial banks and long-term flnanclal Instltutlons. As a result of 
the ongolng process of flnanclal llberallzatlon, the segmentatlon 
between short-term en long-term flnanclal actlvltles and between 
banking and securities business Is slowly but steadlly losing impor-
tance. In varlous reports of the Flnanclal System Research Councll 
(affiliated wlth the Banking Bureau, Mlnlstry of Flnance) and discus-
slons by the Securities and Exchange Councll (affiliated wlth the 
Securities Bureau), thls desegmentatlon process Is extenslvely discus-
sed. Undoubtedly, in the coming years the structure of the Japanese 
flnanclal system wlll as a consequence of these developments drasti-
FIGURE 2 The interbank and open market rates before and 
after the reform of the Japanese money market 
Source: The Bank of Japan 
cally change. 
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MONETARY POLICY 
In thls sectlon, attentlon wlll be paid to the channels of transmis-
slon In the monetary policy process. 
In the transmisslon mechanism of monetary policy a number of monetary 
variables play an Important role. These variables provlde the central 
bank wlth the necessary Information about the orlentatlon and effectl-
veness of lts monetary policy. FIgure 3 shows the transmisslon mecha-
nism. 
FIGURE 3 The transmisslon mechanism of monetary policy 
Instruments Indicator(s) Target(s) Goal(s) 
fiased on Eijfflnger (1986) 
The indicator is the starting point of the monetary policy process. 
This monetary variable is close to the central bank and is directly 
affected by the policy Instruments. The relationship of the indicator 
with the goals of monetary policy, i.e. the final policy objectives, 
is according to Suzuki (1987) somewhat unstable. Therefore, the target 
is used as an intermediate objective. The target is farther from the 
control of the central bank and is not directly affected by the policy 
Instruments, but lts relationship with the goals of monetary policy is 
relatively stable. 
In the following subsections, a brief analysis of the monetary policy 
transmisslon mechanism in Japan is presented for three subsequent pe-
riods. A distinction will be made between the traditional, new and 
modern monetary policy. 
THE TRADITIONAL MONETARY POLICY 1953-1975 
The traditional monetary policy coincided with the so called High 
Growth Period, the perlod of excesslve economie growth which started 
in 1953. During this period the ma in source of corporate flnance was 
bank credit. The heavy dependence of the corporate sector on credit 
from money creating financial institutions, i.e. the situation of 
overborrowlng and the predomlnance of indirect flnance, was malnly 
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caused by the underdevelopment of the capital markets and the existen-
ce of the main bank system and the so called Keiretsu. Most companies 
had a very close relationship with one or more ma in banks. These banks 
operated as a kind of lender of last resort and supported their cliënt 
banks in many ways. The Keiretsu are conglomerates of cooperating fi-
nancial and non-financial enterprises organized on an informal basis. 
The participating enterprises could borrow on favourable terms from 
the financial institutions in the Keiretsu. The main bank structure 
and Keiretsu still exist today and contribute to credit based corpora-
te financial structures in Japan. 
Another important characteristic of the Japanese financial system, or 
more specifically of the Japanese banking system, during the period 
1953-1975 was the so called situation of overloan. Suzuki describes 
overloan as "... the existence of loans and investments funded from 
sources other than deposits and equity capital, so that reserve assets 
(taken as the sum of central bank money plus second-line reserve 
assets minus borrowed funds) are consistently negative" (Suzuki 
(1980), p.5). Borrowed funds include loans from the central bank and 
borrowing from the money market. It is important to stress that in the 
case of Japan overloan not only existed at a micro level, i.e. a 
situation of overloan of individual banks, but also at a macro level. 
The macro based situation of overloan implied that the banking system 
as a whole was in debt to the Bank of Japan and depended very much for 
lts funding on central bank credit. 
It will become clear from the following analysis that the heavy 
dependence of the corporate sector on bank credit and the situation of 
overloan were of great importance for the implementation of the 
traditional monetary policy. On the basis of figure 1 we will present 
a brief review of Japanese monetary policy during the period 1953-
1975. 
The starting point of the traditional monetary policy was formed by 
the interbank (money) markets. The Bank of Japan used the interbank 
interest rates, i.e. the call rate and af ter 1971 the bill discount 
rate, as indicators. The call market is the market for borrowing and 
lending of short term funds by financial institutions. The bill 
discount market is the market for discount ing of bills and was esta-
blished in 1971. 
The Bank of Japan exerted great influence on the interbank (money) 
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markets through its lending policy. Of great importance in this policy 
was the reserve system of the Bank, which is still effective today. 
The commercial financial institutions are under the reserve system 
required to hold non-interest bearing deposits at the Bank of Japan 
against their private deposits. In May 1986, the Bank introduced a 
progressive schedule of reserve ratios. 
The financial institutions are free to decide the daily amount of 
these deposits, if at the end of the reserve period the compulsory 
amount of reserve deposits is attained. The reserve deposits consist 
mainly of credit of the Bank of Japan, so the lending policy of the 
Bank has a great impact on the reserve position of financial institu-
tions. It is important to stress the focus of the lending policy of 
the Bank of Japan at the so called reserve progress ratio, i.e. the 
ratio of the actual amount of reserve deposits to the compulsory 
amount of reserve deposits. By changing the amount of its credit, the 
Bank of Japan exerts great influence on the amount of reserve deposits 
at financial institutions and so on the interbank interest rates. For 
example, rationing of credit by the Bank of Japan decreases the sum of 
the individual reserve progress ratios of the various financial 
institutions. Vhen the end of the reserve period comes nearer, finan-
cial institutions with an insufficiënt amount of reserve deposits 
(i.e. below the compulsory level at the end of the reserve period 
concerned) are forced to borrow in the interbank markets. As a result, 
interbank interest rates will rise. 
The lending policy of the Bank of Japan was very effective during the 
period 1953-1975, mainly as a result of the macro situation of over-
loan. This situation implied that banks were heavily dependent on 
central bank credit and therefore changes in the amount of credit of 
the Bank of Japan did have great consequences for the reserve and 
funding positions of banks and consequently for the interbank inte-
rest rates. 
Besides the lending policy the Bank of Japan did have other policy 
Instruments to control interbank interest rates. The various Instru-
ments are presented in figure 4. 
The main instrument was the lending policy of the Bank of Japan. The 
securities and bills operations, i.e. the buying and selling of 
securities and bills by the Bank of Japan, were focused on neutrali-
zing money market surpluses and shortages. Changes in the official 
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discount rate vere Intended to give signals about the pollcy intenti-
ons of the Bank of Japan (announcement effect). Changes In the reserve 
ratlos, whlch determlne the amount of reserves banks have to deposlt 
at the Bank of Japan In relation to their deposits and other liabi-
lities, only had a modest effect on interbank interest rates. 
The implicit interest rate regulation was an informal instrument of 
the Bank of Japan to regulate interbank interest rates. The interbank 
interest rates were fixed after close consultations between the Bank 
of Japan, the Tanshi institutions (money market dealers whlch are 
according to Suzuki (1987) active as specialized transaction interme-
diaries in the short-term money markets) and the Sanmeikai, the 
representatlve body of the city banks. The Bank of Japan did have a 
great influence in these consultations, so that the interbank interest 
rates could be fixed according to the pollcy objectives of the Bank. 
FIGURE 4 The control of interbank interest rates 
Lendlng pollcy 
Securities and bills 
operations 
Reserve progress 
ratio 
Call and bill-dis-
count interest rates 
Changes in reserve 
ratlos 
Changes in 
official 
discount 
•4 
Implicit interest 
rate regulation 
Partly based on Fukui (1986) 
The target of the traditional monetary pollcy was the broadly based 
lendlng by banks, malnly to the corporate sector. Broadly based 
corporate credit included ordlnary bank credit to the corporate sector 
and the absorption of corporate bills and securities by banks. The 
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ma in argument in favour of this specific target was the situation of 
overborrowing and predominance of indirect finance. Because of these 
situations broadly based corporate credit vas a good proxy for the 
volume of business investments and the level of economie growth. 
The process by which the interbank interest rates (the indicators) 
affected the direction of the broadly based lending by banks vas very 
clear and stable and can be presented as follows. Interest rates on 
broadly based bank credit were, mainly as a result of legal regulati-
ons, informal agreements and cultural customs, inflexible compared 
with interbank interest rates. The rigid structure of credit interest 
rates resulted in substitution effects between (on the one hand) acti-
vities of banks in the interbank (money) markets and (on the other 
hand) the amount of broadly based lending by banks. For example, vhen 
interbank interest rates rosé (as a result of monetary policy actions 
by the Bank of Japan), the inflexibility of credit interest rates 
caused a shift out of bank credit towards investments in the interbank 
(money) markets. 
The end of the monetary policy process is the link between the tar-
get(s) and the goal(s). The main goals of the traditional monetary 
policy were the achievement of price stability (i.e. the consumer 
price index (CFI) and equilibrium in the balance of payments (BOF). 
Through regulation of the broadly based lending by banks the Bank of 
Japan was able to control the level of business investments, i.e. the 
ma in impetus of the high economie growth, and therefore aggregate 
demand, inflation and the balance of payments. 
An additional instrument to control the broadly based lending by banks 
was the so called window guldance, in the words of Suzuki (1987) "... 
guldance to the financial institutions to keep the increase in their 
lending to clients within limits that the Bank of Japan feels to be 
appropriate". The window guldance is a kind of moral suasion, but as a 
result of the situation of overloan, this form of monetary policy can 
be very effective. 
Figure 5 shows a review of the traditional monetary policy. 
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FIGURE 5 The traditional monetary policy 
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THE NEW MONETARY POLICY 1975-1981 
During the first part of the seventies the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system and the oil crisis had a great impact on the world 
economy. Economie growth in Japan slowed down and the government was 
forced to introducé an accomodating Keynesian oriented monetary and 
economie policy. As a result of these developments the rate of infla-
tion increased rapidly. 
The crisis in the Japanese economy had great consequences for the 
economie and financial structures. The shift to lower growth reduced 
the corporate demand for credit and resulted in a sharp decline in the 
situation of overborrowing. The large-scale issues of government 
bonds, necessary to finance the accomodating monetary and economie 
policies, stimulated the development of the securities market and de-
creased the predominance of indirect finance, i.e. increased direct 
finance in Japan. The decline in the situations of overborrowing and 
indirect finance decreased the importance of credit in the monetary 
policy process. 
The process of financial liberalisation, whlch started in the first 
half of the seventies, increased the flexibility of interest rates. 
This development decreased the effectiveness of the channel between 
interbank interest rates and broadly based lending by banks of the 
traditional monetary policy. 
Another problem for the effectiveness of the traditional monetary 
policy was caused by the large-scale issues of government bonds. The 
main part of these issues was absorbed by banks, i.e. money creating 
financial institutions. As a result the money supply increased rapid-
ly-
It will be clear from the above that the target of the traditional 
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monetary policy, i.e. the broadly based lending of banks to the 
corporate sector, neglected the money creating effect of the govern-
ment bond issues. 
It was mostly for this reason that the Bank of Japan introduced in 
1978 a new target, namely the money supply: from July 1978 to the 
third quarter of 1979 the broad based money supply M£ and from the 
third quarter of 1979 the monetary aggregate M2+CDS. CDs are certifi-
cates of deposit and can be described as "... short-term deposlts with 
free interest rates that may be sold to third parties" (Suzuki (1987), 
p.80). 
It has already been mentioned that the process of financial liberali-
sation decreased the effectiveness of the effects of interbank (money 
market) interest rates changes on broadly based lending of banks and 
therefore also decreased the impact of changes in interbank interest 
rates on the money supply. Financial liberalisation caused the creati-
on of more open, relatively non-regulated financial markets with more 
flexible interest rates. As a result of this development two additio-
nal channels of transmission between interbank interest rates and 
money supply were established. 
The first was the channel of financial disintermediation. Because open 
markt interest rates were more flexible than bank deposit interest 
rates, which were still regulated, changes in Interbank interest rates 
had a greater impact (through interest rate arbitrage) on open markt 
interest rates. Depositholders were more incllned to invest funds on 
the open markets when a rise in interbank interest rates caused open 
market interest rates to rise. As a result the funding position and 
consequently the amount of lending of banks deteriorated. 
The second channel included the effects of changes in interest rates 
on private expenditure. Interbank (money market) interest rate changes 
caused open market interest rates to change and eventually even 
interest rates of broadly based lending by banks. As a result the 
opportunity costs of expenditures by surplus sectors (i.e. the yields 
on open market investments) and the costs of financing of expenditures 
by deficit sectors changed. These changes influenced the amount of 
private expenditures and eventually the level of national income, 
money demand and money supply. 
The transmission process of the new monetary policy is presented in 
figure 6. Seen against the background of the inflatlonary experiences 
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in the first part of the s e vent ie s, the ma in goal of the nev monetary 
policy became the achievement of price stability. The yen/U.S.dollar 
exchange rate was introduced as a secondary target to stress the 
importance of preventing import inflation. 
FIGURE 6 The nev monetary policy 
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THE MODERN MONETARY POLICY 1981-
The year 1981 was the turning point towards a new type of monetary 
policy, the so called modern monetary policy. In May of that year the 
Bank of Japan started to sell financing bills on the open market to 
absorb liquidity surpluses. According to Suzuki (1987) "... This was 
the first time since the end of the Second World Var that the Bank of 
Japan had engaged in an open-market operation in the true sense of the 
term" (Suzuki (1987), p.322), i.e. the buying and selling of securi-
ties by the central bank on the open market to increase respectively 
decrease directly the size of the money supply. 
The already mentioned securities and bills operations are engaged 
between the Bank of Japan and money creating financial institutions. 
Therefore, these operations do not have a direct effect on the money 
supply. The Bank of Japan uses the securities and bills operations as 
an instrument to provide the Japanese economy with additional base 
money without directly dlsrupting the growth of the money supply. How-
ever, the securities and bills operations do have indirect effects on 
the money supply. 
Firstly, buying or selling by the Bank of Japan of securities and 
bills in possession of money creating financial institutions increases 
or decreases the amount of reserves of these institutions. The money 
creating financial institutions will try to compensate the changes in 
their reserves on the interbank markets. As a result, changing inter-
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bank (money market) Interest rates will induce portfolio adjustments 
by these flnanclal lnstltutlons and will consequently change the 
amount of the Ir lendlng and eventually the the slze of the money 
supply. However, the process of llberallsatlon of interest rates will 
make this channel less important. 
Secondly, the above mentioned changing of interbank (money market) 
interest rates will influence interest rates on the open markets and 
in the end the level of private investments, money demand and money 
supply. 
The ma in reason to introducé open market operations by the Bank of 
Japan was the development of open, less regulated financial markets in 
Japan. The processes of financial liberalisation and financial inter-
nationalisation induced the introductlon and development of new 
financial markets, such as for example the market for certlflcates of 
deposit (1979) and the Euroyenmarket and later on the introductlon of 
markets for bankers acceptances (1985), money market certlflcates 
(1985) and commercial paper (1987) and the Tokyo offshore market 
(1986). The interest rates on these markets are relatively free. As a 
result the share of the open markets in the total money market increa-
sed rapidly. 
The Bank of Japan could influence to a certain extent the interest 
rates on the open markets through the mechanism of interest rate 
arbitrage between the interbank and open markets. To keep the channel 
of interest rate arbitrage effective, the Bank has introduced in the 
past decade a great number of measures to Improve the interest rate 
arbitrage between the interbank and the open markets, the most recent 
in November 1988. However, the mechanism of interest rate arbitrage 
alone is not sufficiënt to control the interest rates on the open 
markets. Other factors, including differences in market expectations 
and different characteristics of various segments of the open markets, 
determine also open market interest rates. Furthermore, the declining 
share of the interbank markets in the total money market made it more 
difficult for the Bank of Japan to influence the interest rates on the 
open markets only by use of interest arbitrage. Therefore, the last 
decade saw the introductlon of the open market policy as an instru-
ment to exert direct influence on the open markets by the Bank of 
Japan. The Bank has used in lts open market policy various Instru-
ments, such as treasury bills (first in May 1981), certlflcates of 
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deposit and commercial paper (May 1989). The Bank of Japan intends to 
extend the use of treasury bills as an open market instrument. For 
this purpose the market for treasury bills, which is still relatively 
small and underdeveloped, will have to expand and gain in importance. 
To facilitate the open market policy of the Bank of Japan, the Minis-
try of Finance has introduced in August 1989 three month treasury 
bills and considers, according to The Asian Wall Street Journal 
(1989), to expand the Issues of treasury bills in 1990. 
The open market operations of the Bank of Japan have great conse-
quences for the money supply. The money supply is influenced through 
three channels by these operations. 
In the first place, the existence of a direct mechanism has to be 
mentioned. For example, when the Bank of Japan sells treasury bills 
directly to the non-financial sector the money supply will decrease. 
When the Bank of Japan sells treasury bills to money creating financi-
al institutions, which received permission from the Bank to resell the 
bills to the non-f inancial sector, the money supply will also decrea-
se. The consequence of this operation is a deteriorating reserve 
position of the financial institutions concerned (decrease of deposit 
at Bank of Japan). As a result, these financial institutions will 
borrow funds on the interbank (money) market to make up their defi-
cits. The resulting increase in interbank (money market) interest 
rates will lead through the mechanism of interest rate arbitrage to 
rising open market interest rates, i.e. rising costs of private 
expenditures. It will be clear that in the end the level of national 
income, money demand and money supply will tend to decrease. This 
indirect mechanism is the second channel between the open market 
operations and the money supply. In the third place the open market 
operations have great consequences for the supply and demand relations 
on the secondary market of treasury bills, certlflcates of deposit or 
commercial paper and consequently for the interest rates on these 
markets. Through the channel of interest rate arbitrage the other open 
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market interest rates will be Influenced and finally (the familiar ef-
fect s of interest rate fluctuations on private expenditures) the money 
supply. 
The above mentioned channels are presented in figure 7. It is also 
shovn that both the money supply and the U. S. dollar/yen exchange rate 
are used as targets by the Bank of Japan. The Japanese central bank 
wants to achieve the goal of price stability on the one hand by 
controlling the grovth of the money supply (the internal track) and on 
the other by keeping the yen on a sufficiently high level against the 
U.S.dollar to prevent import inflation (the external track). It seems 
for example, according to Hutchison (1986), that in the most recent 
years the Bank of Japan focuses more on the external track, but it is 
difficult to judge precisely to what extent. 
Finally, besides the open market operations two additional new Instru-
ments have to be mentioned: the po int s system and the lending plan. 
The polnts system was introduced in january 1988 to stop the diminis-
hing share of the interbank (money) markets in the total money market. 
In this system the amount of credit of the Bank of Japan individual 
banks are entitled to is inversely proportlonal to the amount they 
borrow in the open markets. The less banks borrow in the open markets, 
the more polnts and consequently the more Bank of Japan credit they 
are allowed to receive. The lending plan is an informal agreement 
between the Bank of Japan and the banking sector regarding the sea-
sonal adjusted quarterly growth of gross short and long term banking 
credit. 
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FIGURE 7 The modern monetary policy 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) However, measured by the strengh of capltal only slx Japanese banks 
are placed in the world top 10. See: 'Top 1000 world banks', The 
Banker, July 1989, pp. 38-105. 
2) Thls group includes the Bank of Tokyo whlch is really a forelgn 
exchange bank to finance international trade. See: Y. Suzuki (ed.), 
The Japanese Financial System, Oxford, 1987, pp. 163-304. 
3) It should be noted that flnanclal innovatlons blur the distinction 
between short-, medium- and long-term. See for an extensive discussion 
of Japanese flnanclal markets: Y. Suzuki (ed.), The Japanese Financial 
System, Oxford, 1987, pp. 108-162. 
4) These flnanclal innovatlons and their effects on monetary pollcy 
are extensively discussed in: Y. Suzuki & H. Yomo (ed.), Financial 
Innovation and Monetary Folicy: Asia and the Vest, Tokyo, 1986, pp. 
45-78. 
5) The maturity for calls was changed from overnight to 3 weeks into 
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overnights to 6 days and for bills from 1-6 months into 1 week-6 
months. Thus the overlap in maturity between calls and bills was 
eliminated. In April 1989 the maturity for bills was even extended to 
1 year. 
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